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Abstract
This article examines the impact of the National Planning Policy Framework’s requirement that all
local planning authorities in England should strive to achieve a robust supply of housing land to
satisfy demand for housing development for a minimum of five years. Conceptually the paper
challenges the orthodox place-neutral view propounded by UK central government (and many
major housing developers) that a bottleneck in land supply caused by deficiencies in the local
(plan-led) planning system is the central barrier to unblocking housing supply in all parts of the
country. Theoretically, we contend that the five-year land supply requirement within the National
Planning Policy Framework is an example of a spatially place-neutral policy approach that does not
comprehend the place-based nuances in local and regional land and housing markets in England.
Empirically, it explores a case study of all 12 local planning authorities in the North East of England,
to question whether a uniform (one size fits all) approach to identifying a five-year supply of land for
housing development across England is effectual. Analysis of empirical data validates concerns that
in some peripheral localities, other variables constrain housing deliverability more significantly than
land supply, issues such as limited mortgage and development finance, an abundance of brownfield
land, negative place-based stigma and development viability concern. The research concludes that
centrally defined, inflexible, place-neutral planning policy is a significant impairment to some local
planning authorities in the North of England achieving up-to-date local plans.
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Introduction
The central assertion of this article is that
the UK Government’s approach to allocat-
ing land for housing development in
England,1 which is codified within the
National Planning Policy Framework
(NPPF) is flawed, and misguided in its
‘place neutral’ and spatially blind approach
of requiring all local planning authorities
(LPAs) to provide rolling five-year housing
land supplies, regardless of the prevailing
housing market conditions. The place-
neutral approach to facilitating housing
development currently pursued in England
is markedly out of line with other Western
European approaches (Hildreth and Bailey,
2014: 368). The lack of place-based (spatial)
sensitivity in the English planning system
appears to be attributable to a myopic cen-
tral government response to the ‘housing
crisis’, which is unwavering in its desire to
accelerate land supply in dynamic housing
markets in southern England, where pres-
sure on land, problems of housing afford-
ability and opposition to development are
intense. Our research investigates whether
the ‘one size fits all’ requirement for LPAs
to identify a five-year supply of housing
land2 is an efficacious approach for the
prevailing and variegated housing market
conditions in England, specifically post-
industrial areas of North East England.
Our central contention is that, in parts of
post-industrial England, LPAs are finding
it increasingly difficult to develop robust
five-year land supplies due to structural
economic issues relating to development
viability (particularly of brownfield3 sites),
place-based stigma and the deliverability of
land rather than the availability of land.
The primary empirical objectives of this
paper are as follows:
• To explore the factors which are hinder-
ing some LPAs in less dynamic housing
market areas in their quest to achieve
robust five-year land supplies;
• To ascertain whether difficulties around
achieving a robust five-year land supply
are having a knock on impact on some
LPA’s ability to achieve an up-to-date
local (development) plan?
• To question which factors, other than
land supply issues, are impacting upon
housing delivery in peripheral former
industrial economic areas of England
(e.g. North East England).
Conceptually this paper will highlight
how the place-neutral approach of requiring
all LPAs to attempt to develop and main-
tain rolling five-year housing land supplies
is creating spatially variegated outcomes
across England. Fundamentally, the policy
implication if LPAs cannot demonstrate a
viable five-year supply is that the local state
(LPA) loses its ability to retain control over
the determination of development pro-
posals within its jurisdiction, eroding a cen-
tral pillar of the English ‘plan-led’ planning
system. Where an authority cannot prove a
robust five-year supply, their local plan is
deemed ‘absent’ or ‘out of date’ in such cir-
cumstances, the Government can direct that
planning applications should be assessed
upon central government’s NPPF ‘pre-
sumption in favour of sustainable develop-
ment’ (DCLG, 2012), which represents a
much less rigorous approach than local
determination of a development applica-
tion. Hinks and Baker (2013) support this
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view stating that both the NPPF and the
National Housing Strategy are essentially
aspatial in nature and are heavily focused
on incentivising development in priority
spatial areas (e.g. London and the South
East), underscoring the central assertion
of this article, that planning is not
the problem in many peripheral post-
industrial communities (e.g. Northern
England). Centralised, place-neutral plan-
ning policies, such as the requirement to
provide a five-year land supply, are a blunt
tool when contending with variegated struc-
tural conditions that often characterise less
dynamic housing markets outside London
and the wider South East of England.
[AQ1]A submission to the Lyons Housing
Review (2015: 58) from major cities outside
London further substantiates this point:
The uniform, aspatial, guidance provided
by the NPPF is found not sufficiently
robust to address different demographic
and market conditions between different
areas of the country and there is a sense
that it is largely driven by a focus on
London and the South East.
Centralising measures infused
into the planning system
Over the last decade, central government in
England has progressively incorporated
centralising measures into national plan-
ning policy to counter a perceived reluc-
tance towards development from some
localities (particularly shire county author-
ities in Southern England, Bramley and
Watkins, 2014). Central government
policy relating to housing and planning
has been framed with a myopic focus on
the burgeoning housing markets of
London and the South East of England.
The recent Housing White Paper (DCLG,
2017) outlines the Government’s analysis of
the causes of the UK housing crisis, as
threefold: ‘. . .not enough local authorities
planning for the homes they need; house
building that is simply too slow; and a con-
struction industry that is too reliant on a
small number of big players’ (DCLG,
2017: 9).
Centralising reform of the English plan-
led planning system continues under the
new Conservative administration, with the
impending adoption of a zonal planning
approach of implied consent for housing
development on the majority of brownfield
sites throughout England. The new zonal
system for brownfield sites was outlined in
the HM Treasury (2015: 45) paper Fixing
the Foundations, it states, ‘. . .this will give
England a ‘zonal’ system, like those seen in
many other countries, reducing unnecessary
delay and uncertainty for brownfield
development’.
The approach of placing LPAs in ‘special
measures’ for a variety of planning perfor-
mance issues (e.g. failing to develop and
up-to-date local plan, being too slow in
determining planning applications and fail-
ing in the Duty to Co-operate) are all
examples of the erosion of the ethos of the
plan-led system and enable developers to
circumvent the discretionary (and localist)
nature of the current system, by effectively
seeking planning approval for development
directly from central government (via the
Planning Inspectorate).
This systematic tightening of central gov-
ernment’s grip on the levers of planning is
symptomatic of ministers’ frustrations with
the perceived sluggishness of the planning
system and exasperation with housing out-
puts. Thus, whilst successive governments
have espoused localism, in actuality,
national planning reform has comprised a
series of centralising measures:
1. The addition of ‘penalty’ buffers to five-
year land supply targets for LPAs
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deemed to exhibit poor prior perfor-
mance on housing provision
2. The target to move to Planning in
Principle (a zonal system) for 90% of
brownfield sites by 2020
3. The proposal to remove the responsibility
to write a local plan from LPAs that do
not have an NPPF compliant local plan4
4. Significant changes to Permitted
Development (e.g. permanent changes
facilitating some offices to residen-
tial conversion)
5. The proposed new power for ministers to
order LPAs to prepare joint local plans;
where The Secretary of State considers, it
will lead to more effective planning and
utilisation of land
Consequently, the five-year supply
requirement in the NPPF can penalise
peripheral post-industrial areas like large
parts of the North of England, by requiring
them to strive to achieve unattainably high
levels of housing land supply.
The theoretical perspective for this arti-
cle is the concept of place neutral, or spa-
tially blind, planning policies, a prevailing
condition defined by Barca et al. (2012: 137)
as when:
. . ., the same solutions tended to be
applied to similar problems in different
places, without any real consideration of
the specifics of the wider regional and
local context. In an era of increasing glob-
alization place is more, rather than
less significant.
Barca et al. (2012) [AQ2]go on to substan-
tiate the view that space-neutral policies
will always have variegated spatial effects,
many of which will undermine the aims of
the policy itself unless its spatial effects
are explicitly taken into consideration.
Hildreth and Bailey (2014: 364) note that
UK central government has been guilty
of disingenuity by utilising the rhetoric
of place-based policy even when its
policies and economic rationale might not
come close to fitting this definition.
Hildreth and Bailey (2014) go on to identify
two fundamental weaknesses in central
state policymaking from a place-based epis-
temological stance:
1. The national (spatial scale) has a tenden-
cy to lack both an understanding and
knowledge of local places.
2. The national (spatial scale) is prone to
the policymaking influences of ‘capital
city elites’. . .over other sub-national
spaces [AQ3]
Achieving a five-year housing
land supply
The Labour Government’s Planning Policy
Statement 3 original requirement for LPAs
to achieve a five-year housing land supply
was modified by the incoming Coalition
Government; NPPF (DCLG, 2012), para-
graph 47 states, that, in order to significant-
ly increase housing supply, LPAs should:
‘Identify and update annually a supply of
specific deliverable sites sufficient to pro-
vide five years’ worth of housing against
their housing requirements’.
The NPPF requirement of a five-year
housing land supply, and the associated
penalty buffers, represent place-neutral pol-
icies that exhibit both of the central flaws
outlined by Hildreth and Bailey, failing to
reflect wide variation of demand for hous-
ing across England.
The main modification to the five-year
supply requirement in the NPPF was the
addition of penalty buffers to penalise
poor historic output in terms of housing
delivery. This modification has raised the
bar and proven extremely challenging for
many LPAs that were already struggling to
achieve a five-year supply. The NPPF gives
broad guidance to LPAs about forecasting
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new housing supply. It stipulates that more
land should be allocated for housing than
was required under previous guidance and
where there has been a record of persistent
under delivery the buffer should increase
to 20%. Our research illustrates that the
introduction of the additional penalty buf-
fers has been a considerable barrier for the
majority of LPAs in the less dynamic
housing markets of the north; with one
respondent describing, ‘. . .a constant pro-
cess of chasing your tail’ (Planner, North
East England).
Achieving a robust five-year housing
land supply is a central part of the evidence
base for achieving the adoption of an up-to-
date local (development) plan. Since the
introduction of the NPPF in 2012, adoption
of local plans nationally has been painfully
slow despite LPAs having been presented
with an ultimatum to adopt plans
synchronised with the NPPF or face central
government intervention. The recent
Housing White Paper (DCLG, 2017: 13)
states that over 40% of LPAs still do not
have a local plan that meets the projected
growth in households in their area. The
White Paper goes on to state, ‘At present
too few places have an up-to-date plan:. . .,
despite having had over twelve years to do
so; and only a third of authorities had
adopted a plan since the National
Planning Policy Framework was published
[in 2012]’.
Our research contends that in reality,
due to legal and appeal decisions challeng-
ing the validity of five-year supplies, the real
level of robust local plans is likely to be
much lower; with some sources suggesting
only circa 25% of LPAs have defendable
local plans (TCPA, 2015). [AQ4] Recent
Savills (2017) research substantiates this
view, noting in 2017, that nearly one in
five English LPAs had their five-year
supply successfully challenged by develop-
ers at appeal.
Methodology
The research comprised two distinct phases:
1. a comprehensive desk-based survey and
analysis of academic and policy docu-
ments, relating to the level of compliance
of local authorities across England, with
the Government’s requirement to provide
a five-year housing land supply
2. empirical study of how the 12 LPAs in
the North East of England were respond-
ing to the requirement and wider aspira-
tions for housing land supply and
development viability.
The empirical research comprised semi-
structured elite interviews with senior plan-
ners5 in all 12 LPAs in the North East of
England, triangulated with data from a
sample of semi-structured interviews with
land managers working for national and
regional housing developers operating
across the North of England. The data gen-
erated by the interviews were analysed
using a coding framework to highlight
themes and trends in the responses. The pri-
mary data substantiate the view that a uni-
form policy to allocate land for housing
across England generates spatially variegat-
ed (and unintended outcomes) particularly
in post-industrial areas of England that
contain surplus brownfield land, negative
place-based stigma, low market values
and significant issues relating to develop-
ment viability.
Is planning the problem?
Kate Barker (2004)6 was tasked on behalf
of HM Treasury with undertaking a review
of the housing market. The central findings
of Barker’s Review emphasised the need for
the supply of land to keep pace with local
demand to temper affordability problems
and price rises. Cheshire et al. (2014) con-
tend that by restricting the supply of
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housing space in the UK, the functioning of
the English planning system (primarily at the
local level) has contributed to increasing
inelasticity of housing supply, echoing, a
central finding of the Barker Review (2004)
and aligning with the view reported in The
Callcutt Review (2007: 32) that the develop-
ment industry feel, ‘the planning system
releases too little land, and its release is
slow and unpredictable’. Conversely, Sharp
(2017) adds weight to the thesis that the
planning system is not the problem by
observing that the impact of the demise of
housing development by the public sector
(over the past 30 years) far outweighs any
problems within the planning system as an
explanation of the English housing crisis.
Significantly, the public sector has not been
a major housing developer in England for
the past four decades, which has coincided
with a historical slump in housing provision;
supply being dependent on a small number
of private sector volume housebuilders.
Fundamentally, Barker’s review stated
that over a sustained period, housing
supply has been unresponsive to pricing sig-
nals and that in large part this reflected con-
straints embedded in the planning system
(Belfield et al., 2015). Post-Barker Review,
governmental pressure intensified on plan-
ning with a neoliberal orthodoxy emanating
from Whitehall, echoing Barker’s central
finding, that planning (primarily at the
local authority level) was a significant
bureaucratic obstruction to housing devel-
opment by ultimately constraining land
supply. From an international perspective,
Cheshire et al. (2014: 81) contextualise this
critique by describing a system in which
development is constrained by regulatory
uncertainty, ‘the British experience . . . pro-
vides some idea of what the future might
hold for other countries as planning sys-
tems becoming increasingly restrictive’.
The populist suggestion that planning
(and in particular local authority planners)
are anti-growth, fails to comprehend the
complex interaction of prevailing ‘place-
based’ factors that will influence how local-
ities (and local authority planners) may best
plan for development and delivery of a
robust long-term housing supply. In the fol-
lowing sections, we briefly consider signifi-
cant facets of the UK housing crisis.
A wider problem than planning?
The Government has recently toned down
its rhetoric towards planning (and the plan-
ning profession) with the former Planning
and Housing Minister (Gavin Barwell),
stating, ‘I don’t think the planning system
is the sole problem . . . Last year, a record
number of planning permissions were
granted, but that didn’t translate into a
record number of homes being built. . ..’7
The Housing White Paper (DCLG, 2017)
also acknowledges that local/regional hous-
ing markets exhibit some place-specific
characteristics. Additionally, in the Autumn
Budget (House of Commons Select
Committee, Treasury Committee, 2017) the
Government announced former minister,
Oliver Letwin will conduct a review of
build out rates of existing planning permis-
sions. However, despite the softening of the
Government’s rhetoric, Whitehall is still
actively implementing place-neutral national
planning policies towards the provision of
land supply for housing (via the NPPF),
which imply every LPA across the country
needs to be incentivised to adopt a positive
development stance. This uniform approach
does not appear to be based on compelling
evidence and is paradoxical to the explicit
‘bottom-up’ localism approach that the
Government espouses in terms of its over-
arching ethos for governing.
By definition, the place-neutral approach
pursued by central government within the
NPPF lacks a nuanced view of the actual
individual stances of LPAs (cities, city-
regions and rural counties) across England
towards development. ‘Negative planning’
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stances are frequently driven by political real-
ities in localities where a vocal majority of
the local electorate are vehemently opposed
to new development (Gallent et al., 2013).
Bramley and Watkins (2014: 877) expand
the critique of the Government’s place-
neutral approach to planning for housing,
by illustrating that LPAs across England
exhibit significant spatial variations in their
approach to development,
. . .areas with more positive planning stan-
ces for new housing are a mixture of urban
areas, particularly older industrial conur-
bations in the North and Midlands, and
sparsely populated rural and agrarian
regions . . . Areas with a more negative
stance comprise a solid belt of London
suburbs and surrounding areas (much of
which contain Green Belt) extending to
the south coast and westward to the
Welsh border. . .
Significantly, most of the areas identified
with a ‘negative planning’ stance are pros-
perous and/or semi-rural localities, which
operate as a commuter belt for London
and where additional housing supply is
most acutely required. It could be argued
that these are exactly the authorities that
the more rigorous five-year supply require-
ments in the NPPF are targeted at. Our
research confirmed that the vast majority
of authorities in the North East had a ‘pos-
itive planning’ stance (Bramley andWatkins,
2014) and were striving to meet central gov-
ernment aspirations by targeting growth and
higher housing targets than under the previ-
ous regional system (see McGuinness and
Mawson, 2017). Our analysis suggests that
perversely these are the authorities that are
most often penalised by the more rigorous
five-year supply requirements in the NPPF.
Furthermore, simply because land has been
designated for housing, and has planning
consent, does not guarantee that new
homes will be built. Ultimately, the decision
to build is reliant on the business models of a
small number of major national housing
developers (see below) who operate a drip
feed approach to housing supply. The plan-
ning system can only facilitate housebuilding
it does not put spades in the ground.
Housing affordability
The UK housing market is characterised by
weak responsiveness of housing supply to
demand change and spatially varied levels
of supply and demand (Dixon and Adams,
2008; Hinks et al., 2013). England has a
tangible spatial mismatch between the
agglomeration of people and jobs (growth
areas) and the distribution of available and
vacant housing (declining areas). Recent
history suggests that private sector house-
builders will only build around 150,000 res-
idential units per annum and in terms of
housing affordability, English housing mar-
kets have become increasingly polarised,
both nationally and subregionally. The
National Housing Federation (2017) states
London has the highest average house price
in England (£563,000) approaching quadru-
ple that of the comparable figure in the
North East (£153,000). [AQ5]In 2014, the
average home in England cost circa eight
times the average salary (Lyons Review,
2014), since when the average salary has
increased marginally to approximately
£27,680 (NHF, 2017); however, in central
London markets,8 the salary multiplier
required to afford the average house is surg-
ing beyond 15 times the average salary (see
Figure 1). Many commentators have
described this situation as completely
unsustainable (IPPR, 2017; Localis, 2017;
Lyons, 2014; Shelter and KPMG, 2014).
Dominance of volume housebuilders
in England
Ultimately, Government and the public
sector has limited influence over the
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supply of housing in England, which is
increasingly determined by a few large pri-
vate sector (volume) housing developers
(IPPR, 2017; Lyons, 2014) (see Figure 2).
The Home Builders Federation reports
that since 1992 the number of small
housebuilders in the UK has declined by
80%.9 In terms of output, Archer and
Cole (2014) state, that in 1960, the top ten
national housebuilders accounted for
approximately 9% of all new housing pro-
duction; the latest figures in the Housing
Figure 1. Ratio of median house prices to median earnings. Source: DCLG (2017).
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White Paper (DCLG, 2017) state that 60%
of new private homes in Britain are built by
the top ten national developers (see
Figure 2).
There is no incentive for volume house-
builders, operating a ‘Return On Costs’
(ROC) business model, to increase the
supply of new housing units, if it saturates
the market, reducing house prices and
returns or profit. This view was substantiat-
ed by the CLG Select Committee in its
report on Capacity in the homebuilding
industry (HoCCLGC, 2017: 8) which states,
The high volume homebuilders dominate
the market and are therefore able to shape
how it operates. Having purchased land at
a given price . . . they will not risk over-
saturating a local market to the extent
that house prices will fall and their profits
decrease. This is rational commercial
behaviour . . . when developers say they
build to meet demand, what they mean is
that they build to meet demand at a cer-
tain price.
Consequently, most volume housebuilders
tacitly tolerate restrictive planning because
it creates scarcity and inflates market
values, underpinned by ‘drip-feed’ or ‘trick-
le-out’ approach to supplying the market in
order to maintain prices (see Adams and
Leishman, 2008; Cochrane et al., 2015;
Diacon et al., 2011).
Archer and Cole (2014: 108) state, ‘The
big beast just grows bigger, rationalisation
and risk aversion prevails, public subsidy is
mis-directed and developers show little
interest in sharply increasing output to
meet public policy objectives’.
Payne (2013) concludes that major
housebuilders in England are inherently
conservative and housebuilding rates in
England remain historically low, as policies
devised to increase housebuilding have,
seemingly, been conceived without an
understanding of the behavioural practices
of speculative housebuilders. There is grow-
ing political concern over the ‘big beasts’
alleged monopolisation (via land banking)
of development land which excludes smaller
developers who may be prepared to expe-
dite development of land (Cochrane et al.,
2015; DCLG, 2017). The Housing White
Paper (DCLG, 2017) acknowledges this
issue and suggests that the largest house-
builders should commit to publishing
aggregate figures on build out rates.
[AQ6]However, there are divergent views
in terms of alleged land banking by major
housebuilders and the Callcutt Review
(2004: 37) contends there are sound
Figure 2. Market share by housebuilder size. Source: DCLG (2017). [AQ18]
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commercial reasons for housebuilders accu-
mulating a sizeable land bank, as they need:
‘. . .to assure their investors that their land
banks are sufficient to cover their needs
in the short to medium term; otherwise,
the investors would see the companies
as being “at risk” and . . . depress the
share price’.
LPAs not providing planning consent on
enough development land
The evidence outlined in this article sub-
stantiates the viewpoint that in many parts
of England, in the short to medium term,
land supply is not, per se, the problem in
terms of housing supply (Adams and
Leishman, 2008). Cochrane et al. (2015)
challenged orthodox explanations of the
housing crisis from major developers,
contending that any simple equation
between land availability and the delivery
of new homes is ultimately unconvincing.
Colenutt and Field (2013) analysed data
from the big five housebuilders10 in the
UK and found that they have short- and
medium-term land banks for 518,000 units
but built only 44,000 units per annum; this
could be attributable to the need to assure
investors that developers have sufficient
land for their business needs (outline
above, Callcutt, 2004). [AQ7]In terms of
existing planning permissions, the Housing
White Paper (DCLG, 2017: 13) reports that
more than a third of new homes that were
granted permission between 2010/11 and
2015/16 have yet to be built. [AQ8]
However, in England it is a myth to suggest
that major housebuilders are the largest
holders (hoarders) of developable land; the
Callcutt Review (2004) noted that 61% of
land was owned by non-property compa-
nies (including the public sector). Herein
lies the longer term threat to housing land
supply highlighted by Shelter and KPMG
(2014: 37) in their report Building the
homes we need, which exposes the growing
corrosive role of land speculators in the
development process, stating,
. . .much developable land seems to be held
out of production in the hands of owners
who do not intend to develop it, but seek
to make speculative profits from land
trading. there is evidence that since the
financial crisis hit, a growing proportion
of developable land has come to be held
by non-development firms.
These facts unequivocally challenge the
thesis that the planning system is largely
at fault for the housing crisis, as there are
clearly significant issues in terms of devel-
opable land and outstanding permission,
which are not (for whatever reason) being
converted into homes. This evidence is irre-
futable and has tacitly been acknowledged
by the government in launching the Letwin
Review to explore the factors that lie
behind the sluggish build out rate of exist-
ing planning permissions.
An abundance of (unviable)
brownfield land
Achieving a five-year supply (and an up-to-
date local plan) has proved particularly
problematic for peripheral Northern post-
industrial areas (e.g. Stockton Borough
Council) that have a legacy of vacant
urban brownfield sites, formerly associated
with either heavy industry or deprived
social housing estates; with low demand
and high levels of vacant property.
Schulze Baing and Wong (2012) demon-
strate a spatial correlation between the
location of brownfield land and depriva-
tion, confirming that although the supply
of brownfield land is dynamic, in terms of
long-term brownfield sites that are suitable
for housing many of the easiest residential
sites, were redeveloped during the Urban
Renaissance (1997–2007). During this
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period the incumbent Labour administra-
tion set a target of 60% of new housing to
be developed on brownfield land, a target
which was comfortably achieved, peaking in
2008 at 80%. With the development of the
‘lowest hanging fruit’, remaining brownfield
sites often have more intractable problems,
such as contamination, that require de-
risking or are not of a scale to be attractive
to volume housebuilders. LPAs in post-
industrial Northern cities are often com-
pelled to take a pragmatic stance on existing
brownfield regeneration sites; from a social
regeneration dimension LPAs cannot ignore
these urban brownfield sites, but often their
inclusion in potential land supply calcula-
tions is part of an ambitious attempt to
meet onerous land supply targets and is in
hope rather than expectation.
The following section reports the main
findings from the empirical research, derived
from analysis of responses from local author-
ity planners and private sector housing devel-
opers active in the North of England about
the challenges facing both in achieving a
robust five-year housing land supply.
The impact of place-neutral planning for
housing in the North East of England
Our primary research focuses on the 12 LPAs
located within the North East of England,
which has the least dynamic housing market
in England, with poor development viability
affecting large tracts of land with potential
for housing development. The analysis
explores wider questions of whether planning
is actually the problem (anti-growth) or
whether in some localities the real barriers
are a more complex blend of intractable
structural issues (relating to industrial decline,
stigma, creeping dereliction), demand-side
constraints around finance (mortgage avail-
ability, wage levels, savings) and the profit
maximising approach of volume housebuild-
ers. Such problems will not be addressed suc-
cessfully by place-neutral planning policy that
has been predicated on paradoxical economic
and market conditions prevailing in large
parts of the South East. At the time of con-
ducting the original empirical research
(spring/summer 2015), only three of the 12
LPAs in the North East of England had a
five-year supply and one claimed to have a
‘marginal’ five-year supply. Subsequent prog-
ress has been limited, with a further two
authorities having achieved a five-year
supply with the adoption of their joint plan
and two authorities claiming to have a ‘mar-
ginal’ five-year supply by Spring 2017 (see
Table 1). Our interviews with developers
revealed that they are sceptical about whether
in reality any of the LPAs in the North East
have a defendable and robust five-year supply
and suspect that claims by LPAs to have a
five-year supply will unravel in subsequent
appeals, inquiries or court rulings. Savills
(2017) confirm this trend nationally by
highlighting that 61 LPAs in England have
had lack of five-year supply confirmed at
appeal by April 2017.
The most significant barrier for LPAs in
the North of England achieving a five-year
supply has been the introduction of the
additional 5 and 20% buffers for previous
under achievement. ‘. . .the buffers have
meant we are constantly playing catch up
. . . you are not meeting the 5 year supply on
a consistent basis so you have to apply your
additional 20%. It is a vicious circle. . .’
(Planner, North East England).
The majority of respondents felt that the
NPPF’s approach to allocating land for
housing development was unhelpful to the
North because of LPAs’ inability to dem-
onstrate deliverability and a key element of
that was establishing development viability.
All the 12 LPAs in the North East have a
broadly pro-development planning stance
and want to provide new housing, principal-
ly to retain their economically active popu-
lations. Despite this pro-growth approach,
there appear to be serious underlying struc-
tural problems which are restricting housing
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development in many parts of the post-
industrial North East.
The NPPF assumes that the only reason
land won’t come forward is due to plan-
ning restrictions and if land isn’t coming
forward to meet the five year supply, the
only solution is to allocate more land . . .
we could have allocated every piece of
land in the borough and we still wouldn’t
have met the housing requirements.
(Planner, North East)
This quote epitomises the viewpoint that
planning and the availability of land are
not the primary issue in the majority of
the post-industrial north east and there
appear to be deeper more structural prob-
lem in housing markets and wider local
economies, which exacerbate the current
problems with affordability and supply.
LPAs’ views on the current
context for housing development
in the North East
A number of North East authorities
reported ‘more aggressive’ approaches from
developers and there was anxiety amongst
the regions’ planners that if an authority
does not have a five-year supply they were
increasingly vulnerable to developers pursu-
ing predatory applications (often on lucra-
tive greenfield and green belt sites). If the
LPA subsequently refuse permission on cov-
eted housing development sites there was a
bullish indication from major housing devel-
opers that they were confident of overturn-
ing the decision at appeal. A planner
summed up this position, ‘Given the recent
appeal decision, they [house builders] think
it is open season’. Another planner elaborat-
ed on a related and crucial strategic planning
issue, the difficulty of providing adequate
infrastructure for development in a climate
of speculative development pressures, ‘we
would have preferred they [planning applica-
tions for significant housing] were dealt with
in a more strategic manner through our local
plan, to ensure the right infrastructure is in
place’. There was a real concern amongst
respondents that strategic planning for infra-
structures is impossible to achieve in the cur-
rent fragmented policy environment where a
glut of planning decisions can be progressed
by appeal or due to successful speculative
Table 1. Status of North East LPAs with regard to five-year land supplies and up-to-date Local Plans
(accurate February/March 2017). [AQ19]
Local planning authority (LPA)
Five-year land supply
status March 2015
Five-year land supply
status March 2017
Up-to-date Local Plan11
(February 2017)
Darlington Borough Council No No No
Durham County Council No No No
Gateshead Borough Council No Yes Yes
Hartlepool Borough Council No No No
Middlesbrough Council Yes Yes No
Newcastle City Council No Yes Yes
North Tyneside Council No No No
Northumberland County Council No Partial/No No
Redcar & Cleveland Council Yes Yes Examined (No)
South Tyneside Council Yes Partial/No No
Stockton Borough Council No No No
Sunderland City Council No No No
Total 3/12 (25%) 4/12 (33.3%) 2/12 (17%)
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applications. This finding was replicated out-
side the North East within rural areas like
the East of England where RTPI (2016: 8)
research stated, ‘There is real pressure
coming on social infrastructure in the East
of England . . . this is exacerbated by small
incremental development that doesn’t bring
associated infrastructure’. Equally issues
about mortgage availability, access to depos-
its and land assembly were repeatedly stated
by respondents: ‘We have got 1500 dwellings
. . . that have planning permission at the
moment that are not being built, because
not enough people want to buy houses,
people don’t have money to buy, and there
are not enough jobs’ (Planner, North East).
One respondent succinctly captured the
majority viewpoint, stating, ‘. . .the issue in
the North is very much about deliverability
of land, not availability of land’, expanding
on the issues the respondent stated:
. . .we had housing market renewal . . . so
we could legitimately say, these brownfield
sites are going to come forward, we had
public sector funding to drive them for-
ward . . . With the withdrawal of funding,
a lot of these sites became unviable.
The dual factors of a continual period of
public sector austerity and, for the first
time in 40 years a complete absence of cen-
trally funded regeneration initiatives in
England (Work Foundation, 2012) com-
bine to exacerbate problems with some
brownfield sites in peripheral post-
industrial cities in England. Many of the
planners interviewed had identified brown-
field sites within their jurisdiction that were,
in current market conditions, patently unvi-
able without an injection of public sector
subsidy. This findings again corroborates
national RTPI data (2016) which states,
‘. . . a ‘brownfield first’ policy will fail to
deliver its full potential if there is insuffi-
cient available funding for the treatment
and assembly of land. New proactive
remedial programmes are needed to
remove constraints on development’.
In some instances, the lack of progress
with brownfield sites in parts of the North
East was due to heavily contaminated
former industrial land and a lack of funding
to assist towards remediation; in other
cases, it was down to low market demand,
low-end values and issues with stigma relat-
ing to the perceived quality of place within
particular communities.
Developers’ views on five-year housing
land supplies
The majority of both major national and
regional developers interviewed held a per-
ception that the majority of the LPAs in the
North do not have a defendable five-year
supply. One developer reflected:
. . .most local authorities we . . . [have
come] . . . across weren’t able to maintain
a five year supply, and it . . . created an
opportunity for developers to come in on
former employment land and push for
consent for that land to be released.
(National Housing Developer)
Another respondent from the development
industry concurred and questioned whether
the minority of LPAs that claim to have a
five-year supply could withstand legal scru-
tiny, pointing to the evidence of a number
of recent successful appeals on the issue (see
Savills, 2017). Most developers we inter-
viewed had been involved in appeals against
planning decisions based on the lack of, or
suitability of the five-year supply. There is a
perception that, as authorities edge towards
delivering a five-year supply, there is less
likelihood of appeals. Where five-year sup-
plies are not in place there is a widespread
view amongst both planners and developers
that appeals are likely. However, at a macro
scale for most respondents aggressive
appeals were not the preferred option with
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developers preferring a more collaborative
(long-term) approach with LPAs where
they felt ‘maintaining trust’ was in the
longer term interests of their business,
rather than a short-term ‘smash and grab’
approach which may sour future relations
with LPAs.
The developers interviewed were general-
ly positive about the NPPF and its ability to
deliver the housing needed for the North
East, although there was a tendency for
them to see housing need purely in terms
of expressed market demand. Typical of
comments reflecting this view was, ‘. . .it is
not the theoretical allocation of sites which
makes up the local authority’s land bank, it
is actually sites that are attractive to the
market, which are viable and will be
built’. Developers were confident a gap
exists in the five-year supply identified by
the LPAs, not because the sites do not
exist, but because some of the sites identi-
fied in the five-year supplies are not viable
or commercially attractive to developers.
It is our view that the five-year housing
land supply requirement represents a crude
centralising move by central Government,
paradoxical in terms of localism12 and fail-
ing to appreciate the nuanced (place based)
circumstances of local housing markets.
Our primary research focus is on North
East England but recent RTPI (2016)
research reports highlight comparable
problems in other peripheral economic
regions like the East Midlands and Wales,
where LPAs have also struggled to achieve
a five-year housing land supply. The RTPI’s
(2016) research reveals that issues of
viability of brownfield land and difficultly
of providing a robust land supply in
under-bounded cities without the co-
operation of neighbouring authorities (see
also Hamiduddin and Gallent, 2012) are
common and recurring issues in many
post-industrial urban areas across the
U.K. The current Government attempted
to resolve the issue of LPAs collaborating
across boundaries to meet housing need via
the ‘light touch’ duty to co-operate (2011
Localism Act). The duty to co-operate has
proved largely ineffective (see McGuinness
and Mawson, 2017) and has recently
evolved into the more formal Statements
of Common Ground with the Government
reserving the right to compel LPAs to col-
laborate on joint plans where it feels it is
necessary. National research by the
Planning Advisory Service (PAS), pub-
lished in May 2014, two years after the pub-
lication of the NPPF, found that only 54%
of LPAs had a five-year supply. The PAS
(2014) study, which received responses from
289 LPAs, found stark regional disparities,
with an impressive 85% of authorities in
London reporting they had coverage, but
only 36% of LPAs in the North East.
[AQ9]More recent research by Savills
(2016) suggests that 44% of local authori-
ties outside of London still do not have a
five-year housing land supply. This indi-
cates that a place-neutral ‘one size fits all’
policy is likely to be failing particularly in
some of the least dynamic economic regions
of the England.
Conclusions: The impact of
place-neutral planning policies
[AQ10] As the Barker (2004), Callcutt
(2007) and Lyons (2014) Reviews all note:
‘land is key’ and within the English context
of acute shortages of developable land in
some urban growth areas (especially the
prosperous South) control over land (and
the parasitic activities of land speculators)
is a critical issue; site assembly and infra-
structure investment may also be required
in order to unlock strategic development
areas identified in local plans. However,
the research in the article shows that hous-
ing and land markets in England exhibit
strong local (place based) nuances which
cannot be addressed by a ‘one size fits all’
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(place neutral) national planning approach
to designating land for housing develop-
ment. This finding has been corroborated
by national research undertaken by the
RTPI (2016) which found in terms of plan-
ning and housing policy, ‘. . .there are
regional differences and one-size-fits-all
policies come with problems’. The empirical
content of this paper confirms that in parts
of England (e.g. North East England) plan-
ning (and the planning system) are not the
pivotal problem in terms of increasing the
supply of housing. Innovative new solu-
tions and policy measures beyond deregu-
lating planning and increasing the supply of
land for housing development are required
if the government is to be successful in its
attempts to solve the housing crisis in all
parts of England. Our research substanti-
ates the key finding of Hildreth and Bailey
(2014) of two seminal weaknesses in central
state policymaking, namely that the nation-
al scale lacks a nuanced knowledge and
understanding of the local scale and central
government is prone to the policymaking
influences of ‘capital city elites’ over other
sub-national spaces.
In peripheral post-industrial areas like
the North East of England, constraints on
the housing market are complex and con-
tributing issues include availability of devel-
opment finance, mortgage finance, wider
land viability issues, a surplus of former
industrial brownfield sites, a related lack
of government subsidies to remediate unvi-
able brownfield sites and corrosive negative
place-based stigma. A place-neutral, capital
city-driven national planning policy cali-
brated to coerce (mainly southern) LPAs
that have a negative planning stance is
proving largely unsuitable for areas with
less dynamic land and housing markets.
This paper also illustrates that national plan-
ning policy is making it extremely difficult
for LPAs in post-industrial communities to
achieve defendable local (development)
plans and without a robust local plan,
these LPAs face ceding control of shaping
development in their locality to central gov-
ernment (via the NPPF) and predatory
major national developers.
Finally, the monopolistic approach of
‘big beast’ volume housebuilders and their
profit maximising (ROC) approach adds a
further layer of complexity to attempts to
increase housing supply throughout
England – a factor that is almost completely
beyond the jurisdiction of the planning
system. Large developers are extremely
selective about the sites that they will
pursue and the speed at which they will
progress development once planning per-
mission has been achieved and they are
not averse to using the appeals process to
coerce LPAs into accepting speculative
development on the most lucrative sites
(often greenfield or green belt sites), at the
expense of other less desirable regeneration
(brownfield) sites that have been allocated
through the plan-led system. As many
reports have stated (IPPR, 2017; Lyons,
2014; Shelter and KPMG, 2014) progress
with the housing crisis requires more SME
developers active in the market and a return
to some model of local authorities develop-
ing affordable homes (see Morphet, 2016).
There have been calls from the House of
Commons Treasury Select Committee
(2017) to lift the local authority borrowing
cap entirely so the councils can build more
homes but it remains to be seen if central
government has the stomach for such radi-
cal steps.
Therefore, in the short to medium term
significant responsibility still lays with pri-
vate sector developers to attempt to allevi-
ate the housing crisis. Ultimately, it is clear
that developers have to attend to the
requirements of investors and creditors,
and if land identified as part of local
authority five-year supply appears to be
too expensive to develop, or is likely to be
unpopular with buyers, the decision on
whether to progress will be based on the
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economic bottom line. The Government’s
imposition of national aspatial, place-
neutral planning policy, rather than being
a centralising solution to problems of hous-
ing supply across England, is actually
penalising some of the places that have the
most positive stance towards development.
A future revision of the NPPF should
respond to these deficiencies in current
national planning policy with a true localist
agenda reflecting a more flexible, place-
based approach to solving issues around
land and housing supply.
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Notes
1. Planning is a devolved responsibility in the
UK and although the basic structures of the
four systems in England, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland are similar, there are
differences in the detail and in how each
system works. Therefore, for the purposes
of this paper we will be focusing solely on
the English system.
2. Referred to as a five-year supply from this
point forward.
3. Brownfield land refers to previously devel-
oped land, the legacy of which often results
in significant sunken costs involved in reme-
diating contamination and removing
dereliction.
4. In November 2017, 15 local authorities were
warned that they had run out of time to pre-
pare a local plan by the Secretary of State.
Steps are being taken to remove the
plan-making function from these local
authorities.
5. All the planning practitioners interviewed
had directed responsibility for developing a
five-year housing land supply for
their authority.
6. An economist and member of the Bank of
England Monetary Policy Committee.
7. Former Planning and Housing Minister,
Gavin Barwell MP quoted in Planning
Magazine, October 2016.
8. The Housing White Paper (DCLG, 2017: 9)
goes on to state the astonishing fact that in
21st century Britain it is no longer unusual
for houses to ‘earn’ more than the people.
For instance in 2015, the average home in
the South East of England increased in
value by £29,000, while the average annual
salary in the region was just £24,542.
9. The Planner (RTPI), 5 November 2015,
available at: www.theplanner.co.uk/news/
small-developers-must-be-at-heart-of-hous
ing-revival-say-experts?utm_source¼ Adestra
&utm_medium¼email&utm_term¼.
10. The big five housebuilders – Bellway, Berkeley,
Persimmon, TaylorWimpey and Barratt.
11. We classify an up-to-date Local Plan as one
adopted after the publication of the NPPF
(March 2012). Many of the councils studied
are in the process of developing a Local Plan
and some Plans are currently being exam-
ined by the Planning Inspectorate.
12. The government has proposed in the
Housing White Paper (DCLG, 2017) to
allow local authorities to develop one-year
(annual) housing supplies but this proposal
currently lacks detail so it is difficult to
assess whether it will reconcile some of the
existing issues with five-year supplies.
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